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Investigating the Impact of Publicly Announced  
Information Security Breaches on Three Performance Indicators 
 of the Breached Firms 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper examines the impact of information security breaches on organizational 
performance. Up to date, there have been only a few empirical academic studies that have 
investigated this issue and they have investigated information security breaches with the 
focus on the short-term impact on the market value of the firm. This study offers an 
alternate approach to investigate this issue as it explores the impact of breaches on 
financial performance of the firm, one year after the breach.  Using a “matched sampling” 
methodology, we explored the impact of each type of breach (i.e. confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability) and also by IT intensity and size. Our results suggest that the direction of 
the impact (i.e. positive, negative) is dependent on the type of security breaches and also 
the impact of IT intensive firms is different from non-IT intensive firms.  Our study also 
includes some important implications for managers and stock market investors.  
 
KEYWORDS:  Information security, impact, security breach, organizational performance, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability
JEL Code:  M150 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Today, as more organizations conduct their businesses over the Internet, exposure to 
information security attacks is  also increasing.  The 2004 Global  Security Survey of financial 
institutions by Deloitte and Touche reported th at 83 percent of respondents indicated that their 
systems had been com promised in 2004, com pared to 39 percent in the previous year, an 
increase of over 100% in a single year (Anonymous, 2004).  The 2004 E-crime Watch survey by 
Chief Security Officer (CSO) m agazine also re ported that 43 percent of respondents noted an 
increase in inform ation security breaches compared to the prev ious year and 70 percen t had 
experienced at least one breach incident
1. Information security breaches include virus, spyware, 
unauthorized access to inform ation, theft of p roprietary information, denial of service (DOS), 
system penetration, sabo tage, and Website def acement, etc. Accordin g to the 20 05 Computer 
Crime and Security Survey by CSI-FBI, the average loss per inciden t from unauthorized access 
to information has increased to $300K fr om $51K and the loss from   theft of proprietary 
information has increased to $356K from $169K, indicating a doubling of such losses com pared 
to 2004 (Gordon et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 2004). 
 Ponemon Institute reported that total costs for each data breach ranged from less than $1 million 
to more than $22 million in their 2006 annual study, which investigated financial impact of data 
breaches involving customers’ personal informa tion (Ponemon, 2006).  In general, costs of a 
security breach on organization can classify in to short-term  and long-term  costs (Erbschloe, 
2005; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; D’Amico, 2000).  For example, short-term costs are costs incurred 
to deal with  the breach imm ediately after or during the period following the breach and thus, 
they are short-term in nature.  These costs include costs to repair or replace the systems, loss of 
business or decreased productivity  due to the disruption of  business operations, and any costs  
related to reporting information to the public, customers, and business partners about the breach, 
etc.  Long-term  costs are cost s that can have a si gnificant impact on the or ganization’s future 
cash flow and thus they have the long-term   economic i mpact and cost s incur over several 
periods.  T hese costs include revenue lost due to  the los s of existing or f uture customers, a 
decline in investors’ confidence due to a nega tive reputation of the or ganization, potential legal 
liabilities from the breach, and reduced goodwill (Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Tsiakis & Stephanides, 
2005; D’Amico, 2000; Featherman et al., 2006; P onemon, 2006).   Thus, consequences of a    
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security breach incident could re sult in tremendous financial losses to the targ eted organization 
(Warren & Hutchinson, 2000; Egan & Mather, 2005; Garg et al., 2003b).   
  While there are many news and surveys that have reported the magnitude of the monetary 
losses from the breach incidents, there have been only a few empirical academic studies that 
have investigated this issue and these previous studies employed an event study methodology 
with the focus on an impact on the market value of the firm (Garg et al., 2003a, 2003b; Hovav & 
D’Arcy, 2003 & 2004; Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004).  The event study 
investigates the stock market reaction to the public announcement of a security breach since 
there is a belief that this unexpected event can have immediate adverse effect on the breached 
organization’s stock price.  Accordingly, such unexpected announcement may lower the market 
value of the breached organization and thus, the organization can incur a loss or experience a 
negative abnormal return because the actual return of the stock would be lower than the expected 
return due to the changes in investors’ expectations about the company since the organization 
can suffer from the public relations exposures than the breach itself.     However, it is unclear if 
this loss will affect the organization’s ability to generate revenue in the long term.   
    Our research objective is to  assess the r elative magnitudes of the im pact on organizational 
performance of different types of security breach es. In this study, we use  the three properties of 
information security - confidentiality, integrity, and availability - to classify the type of security  
breach. Thus, this study offers an alternate a pproach to investigate  the im pact of publicly 
announced information security breaches on firms.   
       Previous event studies examined the market value of the breached firm a few days following 
the announcement of infor mation security breac hes and found the significant negative m arket 
reaction.  If investors’ expectations on the breached firms’ future cash flows were true, financial 
performance of the bre ached firms would be  decreased over tim e.   Although organizational 
performance is a m ultifaceted asp ect that is  difficult to m easure, the common proxy is 
profitability measure (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980).   Thus, this st udy uses financial performance 
indicators (e.g., sales and cost of good sold) as surrogates of overall organizational (or financial) 
performance of the breached orga nization.  To control  for profitability of  the industry in which 
the breached firm competes, we calculated the  industry benchmark and used it to calculate th e 
“expected” performance of the breached firm, which represents the predicted performance of the    
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breached firm in absence of the security breac h.  W hen this is com pared with the financial 
performance after the breach (refer to as “actua l performance”), the difference should represents 
the effect (abnormal performance) from the security breach.   
  This research is one of the few academ ic studies that investigate the impact of the security  
breach on o rganizations using financial performa nce measures, not on the m arket value of the 
organizations.  Therefore, this study extends th e body of knowledge on this  research topic.  Our 
study is also im portant to m anagers since  it helps m anagers to understand the econom ic 
consequences of each type of secu rity breach.   It is especially im portant to m anagers of IT  
intensive firms since it appears that these firm s have the m ost security breach ev ents and th e 
negative impact of the breach events is greater than that of non-IT intensive firms.   
         The paper is organized as follows.   In the following section, we review the previous 
information security breach studies. We then de scribe the financial perf ormance measures used 
in this study.  The next secti on describes the previous inform ation security studies, followed by 
research hypotheses. In the s ubsequent section, we discuss  our research methodology including 
the sample selection technique and statistical analysis.  The results of ou r analyses are reported 
and discussed after that.  Finally , we conclude with a discussion including im plications of our  
study and suggestions for future research.  
 
OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
  Several recent studies have investigated th e impact of public announcem ents of various 
security breaches on the market value of a firm using an event study methodology. These studies 
are based on the assumption that capital markets are efficient to evaluate the impact of the events 
on expected future profits of the firm s (Dasgupta, et al., 1998).  Howe ver, results from  these 
studies on security breach announcements are somewhat mixed.    Some  studies  found  a 
significant negative market reaction after a security breach is publicly announced.  Cavusoglu et 
al. (2004) found that announcem ent of security breach  is negatively associated with  the market 
value of the breached firm .  Their s tudy indicated that the breached firm s lost on average 2.1  
percent of their m arket value within two days of the announcem ent and the loss was larger for  
Internet firm s than for  conventional firm s.  Th eir study also indicated th at Internet security 
developers realized significant positive return from the announcement.  Garg et al. (2003b) also    
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reported that all types o f security breaches realized a negative abnormal return over a three-day 
period from the announcem ent.  However, their st udy reported that security breaches related to 
credit card inform ation theft realized the m ost significant negative impact. In addition, the 
market value of security companies realized a positive impact to security breaches.  Acquisto et 
al. (2006) investigated privacy breaches and found that a sign ificant negative impact on a firm’s 
market value on the day  of breach announcement.  However, this effect decreased o ver the day 
following the breach announcement.  
  On the other hand, some studies found either no significant impact or significant impact on 
only certain types of security breaches.  Hovav & D’Arcy (2004) investigated the market 
reaction to virus attack announcements and found that there is no significant impact over the 0 to 
25 days from the announcement.  Hovav & D’Arcy (2003) investigated the market reaction to 
denial-of-service (DOS) attack announcements for a period from 0 to 25 days and found negative 
average abnormal returns on average 48.6 percent of the breached companies.  These negative 
abnormal returns were greater for Internet-specific companies than those of the non-Internet-
specific companies.  
  Campbell et al. (2003) examined the stock market reaction to security breaches for a period 
of 0 to 3 days from the announcement and found that not all types of security breaches have 
similar economic impact.  The authors found that a significant negative reaction for those 
breaches that are related to confidential information and did not find any significance from the 
other types of breaches.     
  Focusing only on one type of security breaches, such as “unauthorized access to confidential 
data,” Ko and Dorantes (2006) investigated the impact on financial performance of the breached 
firm for each of four quarters after the incident.  The authors selected a control firm that is 
comparable to the breached firm, based on size and industry and then compared the performance 
of each sample. The authors found that the performance of the control sample was higher 
compared to that of the breached firms in general.  Table 1 includes a brief summary of the 
previous information security breach studies.  
 
Table 1: Summary of previous security breach studies    
 

















•  a significant negative 
return involving 
confidential information 
and no changes in return 
for other types of breach 
Garg et al. 
(2003b) 
1996 – 2002   22   Event study  All   •  on average, the loss is 
2.7 percent over one day 





1998 – 2002   23   Event study  DOS 
attacks 
•  significant negative 
abnormal returns on a 
half of the breached 
companies 
•  the negative abnormal 
returns of the Internet-





1988 – 2002   186  Event study  Virus 
attacks 
•  no negative returns over 
5 days after the 
announcement 
•  a half of the sample 
experienced negative 





1996 – 2001  66   Event study  All types  •  a negative return on the 
market value of the 
breached firm and a 






2000 –  
2006 (3/01) 




•  a moderate but 
significant negative 
impact on a firm’s 













•  the control firms 
outperformed the 
breached (treatment) 
firms in general  
 
  In general, majority of the previous studies that have investigated the impact of publicly 
announced information security breach incidents found a significant negative impact.  However, 
depends on the types of security breaches, some found no significant impact. Further these    
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studies have focused their attention on the on the market value of the firm rather than on the 
financial performance of the firm. 
 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
  Financial ratios are the most commonly used performance indicators in evaluating the 
performance of a firm and their usefulness has been demonstrated in many empirical studies 
(Barney, 1997; Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Hitt & Brynjolfsson 1996; Bharadwaj 2000; Hunton 
et al. 2003; Nicolaou 2004). In this study, we used two profit ratios (ROA and ROS) and one 
cost ratio (COGS/S).  Return on assets (ROA) is the most frequently used as a performance 
indicators and a useful indicator to measure how profitable a company is (Bharadwaj, 2000; 
Hunton et al., 2003; Grover & Saeed, 2004).  Return on sales (ROS) is another indicator that 
measures firm’s profitability.  Thus, the higher the profitability ratio is, the more profitable the 
organization is.  Cost of goods sold to sales (COGS/S) measures the percentage of sales used to 
pay for expenses related to sales.   Thus, the higher the cost ratio is, the less profitable the 
organization is since it represents the increase in costs. It should be noted that stock markets also 
use these financial performance indicators to predict the price of a firm’s stock. Table 2 presents 
the descriptions of the financial performance measures.   
Table 2: Description of Financial Performance Measures 
Performance Variable  Description 
Return on Assets (ROA)  Operating Income before Depreciation / Total Assets 
Return on Sales (ROS)  Operating Income before Depreciation / Net Sales 
Cost of Goods Sold to Sales   (COGS/S)  Cost of Goods Sold / Net Sales 
 
  While these perform ance indicators are useful  in understanding firm’s financial co ndition, 
they should  be used with caution.   When the breached  fir m’s perfor mance indicato rs are 
compared with those of a non-breac hed firm without controlling for industry profitability, these 
performance indicators are conf ounded due to the effects of intr a-industry and inter-industry 
variation (Dess and Robinson, Jr., 1984).   
  In this study, we matched the breached firm with control firms that are operated in the same 
industry to compare the difference in performance.  Therefore, there is no effect on inter-industry    
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variation but the effect of intra-industry variation still needs to be controlled.   Accordingly, the 
profitability of the industry within  which the breached firm  competed during the period for our 
test was identified as an indus try benchmark and used it to acc ount for the effects of intra-
industry variation.  See Statistical Analysis section for the detailed information. 
 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
  Information security includes three properties –  Confidentiality, Integrity, and  Availability 
(Ezingeard et al., 2005; Pfleeger, 1997; Solomon  and Chapple, 2005).  Each property com poses 
one leg of the triad as shown in Figure 1 and thus it is known as the “CIA Triad.”    
•  Confidentiality refers to  the pro tection against unauthorized access to data and sy stem 
information and it ensures that only authoriz ed parties can view  the data and ex ecute 
processes.   
•  Integrity  refers to th e prevention of acciden tal or  m alicious alteration,  corruption,  or 
deletion of data or inform ation or system s.  It ensures that only autho rized parties can  
modify it in authorized manners. 
•  Availability refers to the prevention and recovery fr om hardware and software errors and 
from malicious data denials.  It ensures that authorized parties have access to information 
when needed. 




(Source: Solomon and Chapple, 2005) 
There are th ree primary mechanisms that are  used by m alicious individual to defeat these 
three information security properties and they ar e the disclosure, alteration, and denial, and the    
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model is known as the “DAD Triad” (Solom on and Chapple, 2005).  Each of these DAD Triad  
components closely relates to the CIA Triad components as shown in Figure 2.  
 




(Source: Solomon and Chapple, 2005) 
  Disclosure can happen when organizations fail to ensure   confidentiality p roperty of 
information secu rity in the  CIA Triad.  Ac cordingly, we assum e tha t  confidentiality of  
information security is related to security breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential 
information  incidents.  Alteration  can happen when organizations  fail to en sure integ rity of 
information security and  thus  integrity relates to security breaches such  as  website defacement 
and  corruption of information due to viruses or worm s incidents.  Denial can happen when 
organizations fail to ensure availability of information security and  thus, availability relates to 
security breaches such as denial of services incidents.  Based on the discussion of the CIA Triad 
and the DAD Triad, we classified security  breach incidents into breaches of  confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability in our study.  
   
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
  The previous research (i.e., Campbell et al., 2003; Garg et al., 2003b; Acquisto et al., 2006) 
identified that information security breaches involving Confidentiality breaches (i.e. 
unauthorized access to confidential information) have a statistically significant negative market 
returns on firms. Thus, the following hypotheses were proposed.     
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H1A:   The Return on Assets (ROA) of a firm that has experienced an information security 
breach involving Confidentiality is lower following year subsequent to breach than the 
year before the breach, compare to the firms that are similar in size and operate in the 
same industry as the breached firm. 
H1B: The  Return on Sales (ROS) of a firm that has experienced an information security breach 
involving Confidentiality is lower following year subsequent to breach than the year 
before the breach, compare to the firms that have the similar in size and operate in the 
same industry as the breached firm. 
H1C: The  Cost of Goods Sold to Sales (COGS/S) of a firm that has experienced an information 
security breach involving Confidentiality  is higher following year subsequent to breach 
than the year before the breach, compare to the firms that are similar in size and operate 
in the same industry as the breached firm. 
     On the other hand, the previous research  (i.e., Ca mpbell et al ., 2003; Hovav & D’Arcy, 
2004) indicated that information security breaches involving Integrity breaches (i.e., Corruption 
of Information due to virus or worms,  Website Defacement) have no statistically significant 
impact on market returns on fir ms and we would  expect no changes in financial perform ance of 
the breached firm.   Thus, the following hypotheses were proposed.  
H2A:   Compare to the firms that are similar in size and operate in the same industry as the 
breached firm, there is no significant change in the Return on Assets (ROA) of a breached 
firm following year subsequent to breach than the year before the breach when it relates 
to Integrity. 
H2B:  Compare to the firm s that are sim ilar in  size and operate in the sam e industry as the 
breached firm, there is no significant change in the  Return on Sales (ROS) of a breached 
firm following year subsequent to breach than the year before the breach when it relates 
to Integrity. 
H2C:  Compare to the firms that are similar in size and operate in the same industry as the 
breached firm, there is no significant change in the Cost of Goods Sold to Sales 
(COGS/S) of a breached firm following year subsequent to breach than the year before 
the breach when it relates to Integrity.    
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 Sim ilar to Confidentiality breaches, the previous research (i.e., Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003) also 
indicated that information security breaches involving Availability breaches (i.e., Denial of 
Service) have a statistically significant negative market returns on firms. Thus, the following 
hypotheses were proposed.  
H3A:  The Return on Assets (ROA) of a firm that has experienced an information security 
breach involving Availability is lower following year subsequent to breach than the year 
before the breach, compared to the firms that are similar in size and operate in the same 
industry as the breached firm. 
H3B: The  Return on Sales (ROS) of a firm that has experienced an information security breach 
involving Availability is lower following year subsequent to breach than the year before 
the breach, compared to the firms that are similar in size and operate in the same industry 
as the breached firm. 
H3C: The  Cost of Goods Sold to Sales (COGS/S) of a firm that has experienced an information 
security breach involving Availability is higher following year subsequent to breach than 
the year before the breach, compared to the firms that are similar in size and operate in 
the same industry. 
  Given the expectation that information security breaches can be associated with various short 
term and long term costs, such as costs of repairs, legal liability, and negative reputation, we 
would expect that a breached firm’s profit ratios will be decreased and its cost ratio will be 
increased after a security breach.  Thus, the following hypotheses regarding the overall impact on 
the breached firm were proposed. 
H4A: The Return on Assets (ROA) of a firm that has experienced an information security breach 
is lower following year subsequent to breach than the year before the breach, compare to 
the firms that are similar in size and operate in the same industry as the breached firm. 
H4B: The  Return on Sales (ROS) of a firm that has experienced an information security breach 
is lower following year subsequent to breach than the year before the breach, compare to 
the firms that are similar in size and operate in the same industry as the breached firm 
H4C: The  Cost of Goods Sold to Sales (COGS/S) of a firm that has experienced an information 
security breach is higher following year subsequent to breach than the year before the    
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breach, compare to the firms that aresimilar in size and operate in the same industry as 
the breached firm. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  This study employs a “matched sampling” methodology to construct control firms.  This 
methodology has also been used in several previous studies (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 1996; 
Hunton et al., 2003; Bharadwaj, 2000; Barber and Lyon, 1996) and appeared to be most 
appropriate to test our hypotheses for following reasons.  First, financial performance of the 
control firms that are matched by industry and size of the breached firms can be used as an 
industry benchmark.  Second, it helps control for any confounding factors coming from diverse 
industries and size.  
  While the previous studies that used the “matched sample” methodology comparing each 
treatment firm with only one control firm (e.g., Bharadwaj, 2000), this study includes multiple 
control firms that met matching criteria for each treatment firm.  More detailed information 
about selection of control firms is documented in the Sample Selection for ‘a Control Sample.’    
Sample Selection 
A Treatment Sample (Breached Firms) 
  Our sample includes publicly announced all information security breach incidents for the 
period from 1997 to 2004 but including announcements of publicly traded firms. Following 
procedures are taken to select our sample.   
  We collected data using business news articles in the Lexis/Nexis Academic database.  The 
key words used to search the data are “attack,” “breach,” “break-in,” “hacker,” “Internet,” 
“security,” “virus,” “information,” and “computer.”  A combination of such key words, names of 
breached firms that were reported in previous studies, and names of viruses that were identified 
in previous studies were also used.  This approach is similar to the method used by previous 
studies (Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2003; Andoh-Baidoo & Osei-Bryson, 2006).  
Initially, the data set included 105 cases. First, all duplicated announcements were eliminated.  
Then, announcements related to non-public firms were eliminated.  After eliminating cases with 
missing financial data from Compustat and eliminating two outliers from the sample, the final    
 
0040IS-MYUNGKO-2008.doc                                                13                                                            
treatment sample was reduced to 69.  Then the treatment sample was classified into 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability incidents. Table 3 includes the descriptive statistics of 
the breached firms (treatment sample), Table 4 provides the distribution of the information 
security breaches by year, Table 5 provides the distribution of the breaches by type, and Table 6 
provides the distribution of the treatment sample by industry.  It indicates that business services 
industry (i.e., SIC code: 73) incurred the most of the information security breach events. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variable Mean  Min  Max  Std.  dev. 
Total assets ($Million)  74,685 13  1,484,101 206,406
Sales ($Million)  17,041 1  170,064 26,219
 
Table 4: Distribution of Information Security Breaches by Year 











Table 5: Distribution of Information Security Breaches  
Property  Type of Security Breaches  Number of 
incidents 
Confidentiality   Unauthorized access to confidential information   18 
Integrity  Website Defacement & Corruption of information due 
to virus or worm 
31 
Availability  Denial of Service  20 
Total 69 
Table 6:  Distribution of the Breached Firms by Industry 
Two Digit 
SIC Code 
Industry Description  Number 
of Firms 
27 Printing  and publishing  4 
28  Chemical and allied products  2 
30  Rubber and misc. plastics products  1 
35  Industrial machinery and equipment  5 
36  Electronic & other electronic equipment  1    
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Two Digit 
SIC Code 
Industry Description  Number 
of Firms 
37 Transportation  equipment  3 
45  Air transportation   2 
48 Communication  8 
49  Electric, gas, & sanitary services  1 
59 Misc.  retail  4 
60 Depository  Institutions  5 
61 Non-depository  institutions  3 
62  Security & commodity brokers  4 
73 Business  services  25 
78 Motion  pictures  1 
Total   69 
 
A Control Sample (Industry Benchmark) 
  To select control firms, which are comparable to size and industry of the treatment sample, 
firms that operated in the breached firm’s two digit industry code are selected.  For the firm size, 
we used total asset, which is a commonly used proxy for firm size (Hunton et al., 2003).      
  We followed two major steps in selecting control firms.  Firstly, we selected all firms with 
the same two-digit SIC code (industry) as the breached firm from the Compustat database.  To 
control for the firm size from the pre-selected firms from selected firms whose total assets was 
between 70% and 130% of the breached firm’s total assets in the year of security breach incident  
Thus, one or more matching control firms were selected for each breached firm.  As a result, the 
average number of control firms per each breached firm was 42
2.   It should be noted that this is 




     Abnormal performance represents the difference between the actual and expected 
performance of the breached firm.  The actual performance represents the breached firm’s 
financial performance at one year after the breach, which measured in terms of performance 
indicators (e.g., ROA, ROS and COGS/S).  The expected performance represents the predicted 
financial performance of the breached firm at one year after the breach in absence of the security 
breach event.  Thus, if the actual and expected performance is same, then, the difference in    
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performance is zero (0), if the actual performance is greater than the expected performance, the 
difference in performance is greater than zero (0), otherwise, it is less than zero (0). 
  To calculate the expected performance, start with financial performance of the breached firm 
a year before the breach and add the overall change in industry profitability during the period 
from a year before the breach and a year after the breach.  This change is called an industry 
benchmark (see the calculation below) and it is used to control for any effect from the intra-
industry variation during the period.   
  Following Barber and Lyon (1996)’s method, calculation of the expected performance of the 
breached firms is done in two steps as follows.  First, calculate the overall pre-incident industry 
performance from each control sample that may include one or more matching firms by size in 
the same industry for each breached firm (PControlt-1).  This is repeated for the year subsequent 
to the breach (year t+1) to calculate post-incident performance of the control sub-sample 
(PControlt+1).  Then, difference between industry’s pre-incident (year t-1) performance and post-
incident (year t+1) performance represents the industry benchmark, ∆ PIndustry, shown as 
below. 
       ∆ PIndustry = PControlt+1 – PControlt-1                                                                                   (1) 
   where t is a year of the security breach. 
 Second, the expected post-incident performance of the breached firm, Expected(PTreatt+1), in 
the absence of an incident is calculated by adding any changes in the industry’s performance, 
∆PIndustry,  to the breached firm’s pre-incident performance, PTreatt-1,  as follows:     
   Expected(PTreatt+1) = PTreatt-1 + ∆ PIndustry                                                                   (2) 
    Finally, the difference in abnormal performance of the breached firm, Abnormal(PTreatt+1),  
is calculated as the actual post-incident performance, Actual(PTreatt+1), minus the expected post-
incident performance, Expected(PTreatt+1) as follows: 
      Abnormal(PTreat) = Actual(PTreatt+1) - Exp(PTreatt+1)                                       (3) 
For the ROA & ROS measures, Abnormal (PTreat) >0 if the actual performance is higher than 
the expected performance (Actual(PTreatt+1) > Expected(PTreatt+1)) and Abnormal(PTreat) <0 
if otherwise; for the COG/S measure, Abnormal (PTreat)<0 if the actual performance is higher    
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than the expected performance ((Actual(PTreatt+1) < Expected(PTreatt+1)) and 
Abnormal(PTreat)> 0 if otherwise. 
  To test whether the mean difference of the abnormal performance of the treatment firms 
comparing to the control firms, we used one-tailed one-sample t-test. We also determine if it 
reaches the threshold of statistical significance.   
    
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
     We ran one-sample t-test for each category of security breaches to determine if the breached 
firm’s actual performance is less than the expected performance a year after the breach to test 
H1A to H3C.  Then, we also ran the t-test for all data to determine the overall effect on the 
breached firms’ performance to test H4A to H4C.  The results from each category of breach are 
reported as the following:   
The Impact of Confidentiality Breaches 
  Table 7 displays the results of our an alysis of the long-term i mpacts of  Confidentiality 
breaches. While there is som e evidence th at the im pact of  Confidentiality breaches on 
organizational performance is mixed since there was a negative long-term  impact on ROA and 
COGS and positiv e long-term impact on ROS, these  results are not s tatistically significant at 
even the 10% significan ce level. Thus, we concluded that  all three hypotheses, H1A , H1B, and 
H1C are not supported. 
  Table 7:  Abnormal Performance – Confidentiality Breaches 
Performance Measure  Sample 
 Size 
Mean t-test p  value 
(1-tailed) 
Abnormal performance of ROA  18  -0.017 ↓  -0.554 0.293 
 Abnormal performance of ROS  18   0.009 ↑  0.265 0.397 
 Abnormal performance of COGS/S  18   0.089 ↓  1.285 0.108 
Since Confidentiality breaches involve unauthorized access to data or sy stem information, it 
may seem reasonable to expect that the occu rrence of this type of breach can lead to  long-term 
damage to a firm’s reputation including loss of  trust by customers which can result in the f irm 
loosing customers to its competitors. On the other hand a breach involving a virus attack that is 
not directed specifically at the gi ven firm is unlikely to result in long-term damage to the firm’s    
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reputation. We conducted statistic al analysis to explore differences in the im pacts of 
Confidentiality breaches and Virus attacks, with the resu lt being that there was no statistically  
significant difference between impacts of these two different types of breaches. 
 
The Impact of Integrity Breaches 
Table 8 displays the results of our analysis of the long-term impacts of Integrity breaches. While 
there is some evidence that the impact of Integrity breaches on organizational performance is 
mixed since there was a negative long-term impact on ROA and positive long-term impact on 
ROS and COGS, these results are not statistically significant at even the 10% significance level. 
Since the financial performance of the breached firms did not change significantly, we concluded 
that all three hypotheses, H2A, H2B, and H2C are supported. 
    Table 8:  Abnormal Performance – Integrity Breaches 
Performance Measure  Sample 
Size 
Mean t-test P  value 
(1-tailed) 
Abnormal performance of ROA  31  -0.057 ↓  -1.184   0.123
 
Abnormal performance of ROS  31  0.137 ↑  0.837   0.205
 
Abnormal performance of COGS/S  31  -0.008 ↑  -0.173   0.431
 
 
  The  Integrity breaches that occurred in the firm s of our sam ple involve two subtypes:  
Website Defacement or  Corruption of Information due to virus or worm.  Since  Corruption of 
Information due to virus or worm involve technical damage which often be easily repaired in a 
relatively short-time with but no other damages, it seems reasonable to assume that it might have 
a minimal long-term impact on a firm’s performance.  However the estimated cost of well known 
virus, ILOVEYOU, ranged between less than $1 billion to $15.3 billion in software damage and 
computer downtime (Grabosky, 2007) and it reached approximately 45 million users in one day 
(SearchSecurity.Com, 2006).  On the other hand,  Website Defacement may have detrimental 
impact on the credib ility and   reputation of the organization,  leading to long-term da mage 
including loss of customer trus t and loss of revenue (Hollander , 2000). We conducted statistical  
analysis to explore differe nces in  the im pacts of  Corruption  of Information and  Website 
Defacement breaches, with the res ult being that there was no statistically significant difference 
between impacts of these two different subtypes of Integrity breaches.    
 
0040IS-MYUNGKO-2008.doc                                                18                                                            
 
The Impact of Availability Breaches 
  Table 9 displays the results of our analysis of the long-term impacts of Availability breaches. 
While the re is som e evidence tha t the im pact of   Availability breaches on organizational 
performance is m ixed s ince there was a ne gative long-term  i mpact on ROA and ROS and 
positive long-term impact on COG/S, only the result involving ROA is statistically significant at 
the 10% significance level. Thus, we concluded that H3A is supported and H3B and H3C are not 
supported. 
Table 9: Abnormal Performance – Availability Breaches 
Performance Measure  Sample 
Size 
Mean t-test p  value 
(1-tailed) 
Abnormal performance of ROA  20  -0.090 ↓  -1.515 0.073
a 
 Abnormal performance of ROS  20  -0.044 ↓  -0.688 0.250 
Abnormal performance of COGS/S  20  -0.046 ↑  -0.593 0.280 
 a 10 % level 
  Estimated cost of  Denial of Service inciden ts was over $65 m illion in 2003 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey, which was  the second most expensive breached incident 
(Williams and Joshi, 2004).  Since  Denial of Service (DOS) attack is targeted at the breached 
firms, its intention is to  destroy a business, it s reputation, and its res ources, it reasonable to 
expect th at this type of breach m ay have  a greater long term  i mpact on organization al 
performance than Viru s attacks, sin ce the latter  is not targ eted at the sp ecific firm but affects 
many firms, these firms make effo rt to repair such dam age quickly as possible as the entire 
market as a whole. W e conducted statistical anal ysis to explore differen ces in the im pacts of 
Denial of Service and Virus Attack breaches, with the result being  that there was no statistically 
significant difference between impacts of these two different types of breaches. 
 
The Impact of Overall Security Breaches 
  Table 10 displays the results of our analysis of  the overall long-term impacts. While there is 
some evidence that the long-term impact of security breaches on organizational performance is a 
negative lo ng-term impact, ROA is th e on ly m easure with statis tically significan t long -term    
 
0040IS-MYUNGKO-2008.doc                                                19                                                            
negative impact at even the 10% significance level. Thus, we concluded that hypotheses, H4A is 
supported but H4B and H4C are not supported. 
   Table 10:  Abnormal Performance - Overall 
Performance Measure  Sample
 Size 
Mean t-test p  value 
(1-tailed) 
Abnormal performance of ROA  69  -0.056 ↓  -1.966    0.027
b 
Abnormal performance of ROS  69   0.051 ↓   0.671  0.253
  
Abnormal performance of COGS/S  69   0.006 ↓   0.177   0.430 
              
 b     5 % level 
 
    To better understand if impact  of security breaches of the fi rms has different consequences 
depending on its IT intensity, w e followed Cha tterjee’s (2001) classi fication of industries 
according to IT roles  into th e catego ries of  Automate,  Informate-Up-and-Down, and 
Transformative.  Automate firms  usually replace expensive human labor with IT; Informate-Up-
and-Down firms usually provide inform ation to e mpower employees and give m ore control to 
management;  Transformative firm s radically change traditi onal ways of doing business by  
redesigning business p rocesses,  structures and relationships a nd the bank is an exam ple of 
transformative industry. W ithin this classification schem e the  Transformative category is 
considered to be more IT intensive than the Automate or Informate-Up-and-Down categories. 
Table 11: Overall Cases by Breach Type and IT Intensity Category 











Automate 0  5  2  7 
Informate-up-and-down 3  7  1  11 
Transformative 15  19  17  51 
Total  18 31  20  69 
 
  Table 11 shows the breakdown by types of breach  and IT intensity category. Interestingly, 
over 70% of security breach events in our sample are from firms in the Transformative category.  
Given this breakdown and our intere st in exploring the effect of  IT intensity on the im pact of 
security breaches, we conducted  analysis on the im pact of  the security breaches for the 
Transformative IT in tensity categ ory (s ee T able 12 )  and the oth er two less -IT in tensive 
categories (see Table 13). Both the ROA and COGS/S measures were statistically significant for    
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the Transformative IT intensity category, the results sugge sting that security breaches have a  
long-term impact on the performance. 
 
Table 12:  Abnormal Performance - Transformative Industry 
Performance Measure  Sample 
 Size 
Mean t-test P  value 
(1-tailed) 
Abnormal performance of ROA  51  -0.086 ↓  -2.456    0.009
a 
Abnormal performance of ROS  51  -0.038 ↓  -1.105   0.137 
Abnormal performance of COGS/S  51  0.535 ↓   1.942    0.029
a 
             a 5 % level 
      
 
 Table 13: Abnormal Performance – Automate and Informative-Up-and-Down  
Performance Measure  Sample 
 Size 
Mean t-test P  value 
(1-tailed) 
Abnormal performance of ROA  18  0.026 ↑   0.622   0.271 
Abnormal performance of ROS  18  0.303 ↑   1.110   0.142 
Abnormal performance of COGS/S  18  -0.127 ↑  -1.153   0.133 
              
 
  We also explored the difference in the mean impacts for Transformative IT intensity category 
and the other two les s-IT intensive categories (s ee Table 14a). Thes e results suggest that with 
regards to the ROA & ROS measure, that the negative impact on the Transformative IT intensity 
category is more severe than for  the other two less-IT intensive categories for the three types of 







 Table 14a: Difference in Abnormal Performance by Breach Type and IT Intensity 









Non-Transformative    0.105    0.073   0.332  Confidentiality  
Transformative  -0.423 -0.004    0.042    
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Non-Transformative    0.002   0.432  -0.126  Integrity 
Transformative  -0.093 -0.049    0.066 
Non-Transformative   0.051   0.016  -0.591  Availability 
Transformative  -0.115 -0.054    0.050 
 
  We also did a comparison of pairs of breach types and IT intensity categories (see Table 
14b). It may be noted that with regards to the ROA measure that the long term damage to 
Transformative firms is more severe than the corresponding damage to non-Transformative 
firms.  With regards to the COGS/S measures, the long-term damage to non-Transformative 
firms is far less severe than the corresponding damage to Transformative firms.   
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Availability   
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-0.093  0.258  -0.049  0.343 0.066 0.071  
                        
  We then did an analysis by Firm Size by categorizing firms as being Large or Small based on 
total assets followed approach taken by Hunton et  al. (2000).  As shown  in Table 15, cases are 
closely distributed by category of breach for both Large and Small firms.  
 
Table 15: Overall Cases by Breach Type and Firm Size 






Total Number of 
incidents 
Large 9  18  10  37 
Small 9  13  10  32 
Total  18 31  20  69 
 
 
 Table 15a: Difference in Abnormal Performance by Breach Type and Firm Size 
Breach Type  Firm Size  Mean ROA  Mean ROS  Mean COGS/S 
Small  -0.007 0.029  0.155  Confidentiality  
Large  -0.028 -0.012  0.025 
Small  -0.111 0.296  0.036  Integrity 
Large  -0.017 0.022  -0.040 
Small  -0.123 -0.085  0.018  Availability 
Large  -0.057 -0.003  -0.110 
 
  In general, difference in abnormal performance is less for large firms than small firms except 
for ROA and ROS of Confidentiality as shown in Table 15a.  Large firms that have experienced 
Confidentiality breach incidents seem to suffer more and their performance decreased more than 
the smaller firms in terms of ROA and ROS indicat or.   T his might be due to the difference in 
media coverage or damage of fir m’s reputation.  Large firm s are wel l recognized by public, 
compared to smaller firms and thus, these large firms might have had significant effect on sales,    
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reflected by the perception of their custom ers, especially on the fact that  firms are not handling 
their confidential information properly.    
     
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
  Over the p ast few years, ensu ring securi ty of organizational inform ation has been a 
challenging task for m anagers due to a continuo usly increasing security breach incidents (Egan 
& Mather, 2005; Doherty and Fulford, 2005).  W hile other previous studies have explored the 
impact of security breaches on the market value of the firm, this study is one of the few academic 
studies tha t investiga te the im pact of  the sec urity b reach incid ents on the o rganizational 
performance using financial perform ance i ndicators, not on the m arket value of the  
organizations.   
  We identified the actual and expected performance of the firm  a year before the breach and  
captured abnormal performance of the breached firm  to investig ate the difference in f inancial 
performance due to the security breach event. Ba sed on this analysis, the results can be one of 
three possible situations as following.  If abnorm al performance of the pr ofitability indicators, 
such as ROA and ROS shows the  negative value, it indicates that performance of the breached 
firm has decreased after the breac h.  If it is 0, the perform ance of the breached firm is the same 
as before even after the breach.  If it is the positive value, the performance of the breached firms 
has increased after the breach. In the case of the  costs indicators, such as cost of goods sold, 
opposite is true.   
  In general, the breached firm s’ abnormal performance of the pr ofitability indicators in our 
study suggests that except for the  Integrity breach category, security breaches can have a long-
term negative impact on the performance of the breached firm.   
Our results suggest that both Confidentiality and Availability breaches could be considered to 
each have a long-term  negative impact on organizational performance, while Integrity breaches 
have no long-term negative impact on organization: 
o  Confidentiality: To the  extent th at  Confidential Information is a strategic business asset, 
particularly for firms that are Large and/or Transformative, it is not surprising that damage to 
the firm would rem ain even a y ear after the in cident since a br each could result in loss of    
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competitive advantag e. This sugg ests that with rega rds to  Confidentiality b reaches, the 
security strategy has to be heavily oriented  towards knowledge of & m onitoring of potential 
intruders & prevention of breaches since recovery strategies may not eliminate the long-term 
effects of this breach. For as has been said  before, once lost confidentiality cannot be 
restored. 
o  Integrity: As discussed previously, this type of breach inclu des Corruption of Information, 
and  Defacement of Websites. W ith regards to   Corruption of Information, the Se mantic 
Integrity subsystem and Backup  & Recovery subsystems of many DBMS offer possibilities 
for effective recovery strateg ies and the occurrence of  Corruption of Information requires 
additional recovery effort as well as the n eed for improved detection & prevention system s. 
With the increasing availabili ty on better techniques, m ethods, and tools for the design & 
development of effective & efficient  user interfaces, breaches invo lving  Defacement of 
Websites could motivate firms to take advantage of such resources resulting in better & more 
cost effective websites. 
o  Availability: The results appear to suggest that the impact of security breaches could be long-
term. Part of the issue here is the importance of the Internet to the given business, including 
how long could it function without som e or all of  its internet services. T hus the firm has to 
have a good understanding of the relationship be tween its critical business operations and 
Internet access, as well as knowledge of the business objectives of its co mpetitors and other 
potential attackers. 
So what is the implication of these results, some of which go against our initial expectations? 
  There are three com peting argum ents regardi ng to the impact of i nformation security 
breaches.  First, security breaches can have a long-term negative financial impact on firms. This 
position appears to be supported by our results for Availability and Confidentiality breaches but 
not for Integrity breaches. Second, most of security breaches have no impact or minimum impact 
on firms. This position appears to be supported by our results for  Integrity.  In addition, another 
argument is that firms make new investments in information security as a resu lt of the breaches 
and these investments may lead to  long-term economic benefits.  T hus, a third argum ent is that 
security breaches may have a net positiv e long-term impact on firm s (Campbell et al.,  2003). 
This third position appears not to be supported by our results.     
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  While stock market investors tend to unload the breached firm’s stock after a breach possibly 
because they believe that the breached firm has been damaged and it has substantial economic 
consequences, it appears that for Integrity, any such damage was at most temporary and that the 
breached firms were able to recover and perform even better than before. One possible 
explanation is that the breached firm may be able to address any weaknesses in information 
security in a timely manner, which prevented sustained damage.  Another possibility is that the 
breached firm may be investing resources to improve further (Campbell et al., 2003).  As a 
result, the organization became more disciplined, efficient, and effective after the breach.   
 
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
      Our results have im portant implications for top managers and stock m arket investors. First, 
protection of confidential info rmation has to be ensured.  We ll-defined security policies and 
procedures are a necess ary step toward an eff ective information security program.  Also an y 
known vulnerabilities to security m ust be managed to ensure regaining  the confidence of overly 
concerned investors. S econd, alth ough the mark et value of the breached firm m ight drop 
temporarily as indicated  in the p revious event studies, overall negative im pact on the firm ’s 
financial performance might be short-term for some types of information incidents (i.e. Integrity) 
or depends on the type of industr ies in which firms operate (i.e. Automate or Informate-Up-and-
Down). Our study indicated that  Transformative firms are most im pacted by security breaches.  
Thus, managers in those industr ies should adequately equipped with defense m echanisms to 
mitigate any potential source of threat or vulnerability, especially in the case of Confidentiality 
or Availability breaches.    
  Thirdly, given the difficulty of recovering from Confidentiality breach incidents, primary 
emphasis has to be placed on strategies to prevent the occurrence of this type of breach, and 
secondary emphasis to prevention and recovery with regards to Availability breaches. Such 
strategies would involve technical (e.g. competitor analysis, detection, protection, and recovery), 
human, organizational, and possibly inter-organizational components. Further, they require the 
organization to have an operational-level of understanding of the value of its information and 
knowledge assets both to itself as well as to potential intruders (e.g. competitors, players in 
financial markets, employees, etc).     
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    Our study is not witho ut lim itation.  It is  possible that the m ajority of breached fir ms 
included in our sam ple might be large firm s since they are publicly known fir ms and so might 
not represent the overall breached firms in general.  In addition,  range of m edia coverage and  
extensiveness of custom er perception about the breach, other  major business announcem ents 
such as a merger, adoption of  new technology, or change in top  management might have had a 
significant effect on sales and operating incom e. Thus, such factors that have not accounted in 
this study m ight have biased the results. Furt her research m ight be  needed including m ore 
current security breach events and also incl uding long er than a year after the breach to 
investigate if the breach has a material impact on the long-term financial performance.   
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1.   This was obtained at http://www.cert.org. 
2.   There are 2 firms that had only one control firm each, thus, we used the industry SIC code to 
1 digit to get more control firms for these 2 firms.  
 
 
APPENDIX A:  Samples of Publicly Announced Information Security Breaches 
Source:  The New York Times 
Date:      May 17, 2002 
Title:      13000 Credit Reports Stolen by Hackers (A Single Breach Announcement) 
 
BODY: Hackers posing as employees of the Ford Motor Credit Company have in recent months 
harvested a trove of 13,000 credit reports -- a virt ual one-stop shop for fraud and identity theft -- 
with data on consum ers in afflue nt neighborhoods across the country. 
The company said in a lette r to the victims that computer intruders used an authorization code 
from Ford Credit to get the credit reports from Experian, one of three m ajor reporting agencies. 
"I've never seen anything of this  size," a spokesman for Experian, Donald Girard, said. "Privacy 
is the hallmark of our business. We're extraordinarily concerned about the privacy issue here, and 
the trust factor.” The in quiries gave the intrud ers access to each victim's  personal and financial 
information, including address, Social Securi ty num ber, bank and credit card accounts and 
ratings of creditworthiness, which can be used to identify the best targets. 
 
Source:  USA Today 
Date:              July 27, 2004 
Title:      MyDoom.M Virus Slams Search Sites (A Multiple Breach Announcement) 
 
BODY: The latest version of the MyDoom  e-mail virus, MyDoom.M, fooled tens of thousands 
of com puter-savvy workers into triggering a di sruption that knocked Internet search sites 
Google, Yahoo, Lycos and AltaVista off line for several hours Monday. 
 
 